Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View by unknown
Notes
Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil
Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View
In the last fourteen years Congress has enacted a number of statutes
that are intended to protect civil rights but that do not explicitly create
a private right of action.' Federal courts have generally considered
implication of private rights" a necessary or useful tool in the enforce-
ment of these statutes.3 The courts, in finding implied rights of ac-
tion under civil rights statutes, are simply following a long tradition
that favors implying rights of action for parties asserting their own
civil rights.4
This tradition is threatened by the Supreme Court's 1975 decision
in Cort v. Ash, 5 which promulgated several criteria "relevant" to the
implication question.0 The Cort opinion culminated a series of de-
l. These statutes include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
3§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1970)); Voting Rights Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 439' (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1970)); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat.
373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (Supp. V 1975)); Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 79-
(Supp. V 1975)). Congressional enactments that by their terms guarantee civil rights but
do not provide for private remedies are not a new development. See, e.g., Cihil Rights
Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)).
2. The implication of a private right of action has been defined as "the extension
of a civil remedy to one injured by another's breach of a statute or regulation not pro-
viding for such relief." Note, hplying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes,
77 HARv. L. REv. 285, 285 (1963). The problem of deciding when to imply the existence
of a private right of action might have been avoided had Congress followed Professor
Wechsler's suggestion in the 1940s and enacted an enabling statute providing guidelines
for implication of causes of action by the federal courts. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction
and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 225, 241 (1948).
Congress apparently has never acted on this suggestion.
3. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969) (voting rights);
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-87 (7th Cir. 1977) (rights of handi-
capped); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1956) (non-
discrimination on airlines); Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 780
n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (sex discrimination). Some commentators have agreed. See, e.g.,
Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim
for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 451-56 (1974); Shelton & Berndt, Sex Discrimination in Vo.
cational Education: Title IX and Other Remedies, 62 CALIF. L. Rv. 1121, 1149-59 (1974).
4. See pp. 1387-92 infra.
5. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
6. Id. at 78.
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cisions, outside the civil rights area, that have redefined the circum-
stances in which federal courts should imply private rights of action. 7
Since the Cort decision, some lower federal courts have applied its
criteria as a restrictive standard in testing for the existence of a private
right of action under civil rights statutes.8 In probably the most far-
reaching of these decisions, Cannon v. University of Chicago,9 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that no private right of action exists under Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972,10 which forbids discrimination
on the basis of sex in most federally funded educational programs.
7. See pp. 1381-86 infra. The increasingly restrictive view of the implication doctrine
parallels an increasingly restrictive approach by the Supreme Court to the issue of
standing, a question related to the first criterion of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975),
that legislation be enacted for the plaintiff's "especial benefit." Compare Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the Wvar, 418 U.S. 208, 220-22 (1974) (standing depends on
whether plaintiff suffers "concrete injury" by governmental action) and United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175-78 (1974) (injury must not be common to all members
of public) with Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (standing depends on whether
plaintiff has "personal stake" in outcome and whether his legal interest is sufficiently
adverse to that of defendant). One commentator has examined three of the Court's most
recent standing decisions, Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S.
26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); and Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614 (1973), and concluded that they have further narrowed the scope of standing, so
that even before the court can reach the merits the plaintiff must show that the harm
he alleges is certain, and not merely probable, and that the governmental action com-
plained of has a causal connection to the harm. Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. U.L. REv.
69, 72-74 (1977).
Some cases suggest that there are circumstances in which there is little difference
between speaking in terms of an implied right of action and standing. See, e.g., National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 467 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). But the two concepts are logically distinct, as the majority in
this case noted. Id. at 456 (court need reach standing question only if private right
exists). Professor Albert has pointed out that the standing question may form a component
of the cause of action but does not provide the cause of action itself. Albert, supra note
3, at 428-29. The standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff is a proper one to
assert the cause of action; it does not answer the prior question whether a cause of
action exists. See Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some
Implications for Inplication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1408-11 (1975) (standing focuses
on whether proper party asserts claim; implication focuses on whether private action
proper).
8. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1071-75 (7th Cir. 1976);
aff'd on rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W.
3438 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1977) (No. 77-926) (no private right under Title IX of Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (Supp. V 1975), to challenge professional
school admissions as discriminatory on basis of sex); People's Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City
of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (no private right under Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, §§ 101(c), 109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9301(c), 5309 (Supp.
V 1975), to challenge racial discrimination in housing); Cape v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 563
F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) (lower court found no private right under Title IX; court of
appeals did not address question).
9. 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd on rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1977),
petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1977) (No. 77-926).
10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (Supp. V 1975).
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This Note contends that insofar as Cort is read as restricting the
test for implication, its reasoning should not mechanically be applied
to the area of civil rights law. The Note identifies reasons of both
tradition and policy for reading the Cort criteria as favoring impli-
cation where the broad purpose of protecting civil rights underlies a
statute. Finally, the Note illustrates the proper application of Cort
in the civil rights area by using it to argue that a private right of
action exists under Title IX. 11
I. Cort v. Ash and Two Lines of Implication Cases
Although the federal courts have been attempting for more than
sixty years to develop a coherent doctrine of implication,' 2 the Su-
preme Court made no explicit attempt to summarize the criteria
for implying private rights until its 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash."3
The Cort decision, which set out four factors "relevant" to the im-
plication question, 14 has been viewed as enunciating a restrictive
view of the implication doctrine. 1" The Cort criteria were based on
principles drawn from the dominant strand of Supreme Court prece-
dent dealing with implication.' But it remains unclear what effect
Cort will have on a recurrent but less-noted theme in implication
11. Although the Cannon court held that no private right of action exists under
Title IX, at least one federal court has reached the opposite conclusion. Piascik v. Clevc-
land Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 780 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1976). A federal magistrate
has suggested, in dictum, his strong disagreement with the Cannon result. Alexander v.
Yale, C. No. N-77-277, slip op. at 6-10 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 1977). See Commentary, Sex
Discrimination in Athletics: Conflicting Legislative and Judicial Approaches, 29 AL'.. L.
REV. 390, 415-18 (1978) (contrasting Cannon and Piascik). Compare Shelton & Berndt,
supra note 3, at 1149-59 (private right of action ought to be implied) with Note, Taxing
Sex Discrimination: Revoking Tax Benefits of Organizations Which Discriminate on the
Basis of Sex, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 641, 661 (stating without argument that no private right
exists).
12. The first federal decision explicitly dealing with the implication doctrine appears
to have been Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). See pp. 1382-83 infra.
The Court announced what almost seemed a "test" for implication in Wyandotte Transp.
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967). See note 37 infra (discussing this "test").
13. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
14. Id. at 78.
15. See, e.g., Climan, Civil Liability Under the Credit-Regulation Provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 206, 261 (1978); McMahon & Rodos,
Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DicK.
L. REv. 167, 167-68, 177, 184 (1976); Note, Implication of Private Actions Froin Federal
Statutes: From Borak to Ash, 1 J. CoRP. L. 371, 371-72, 380-89 (1976). The judgment as
to how restrictive the Cort test actually is will have to await further judicial explication.
See pp. 1386-87 infra.
16. See pp. 1381-86 infra.
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cases that favors implication of private remedies where parties assert
statutorily protected civil rights.17
A. Genesis of the Cort Criteria
The approach adopted in Cort can best be understood by com-
paring the specific criteria promulgated in that case with the precedents
from which they were drawn. Cort v. Ash was a derivative damage
action by a stockholder of Bethlehem Steel Corporation against the
corporation's chairman for violating a criminal statute", that prohibited
corporate expenditures in connection with a presidential election. The
principal question for decision was whether a private right of action
should be implied under the statute.19 In declining to find a private
right, the Court, through Justice Brennan, listed four factors as "rele-
vant" to the determination:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted," . . . that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indi-
cation of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law?20
Although the criteria appear neutral, the Court's application of them
made clear that private rights of action would not lightly be implied.21
An analysis of the precedent supporting each criterion makes clear
17. For the purposes of this Note, a civil rights statute is one enacted to prohibit
discrimination against an identifiable class or group on the basis of an immutable
characteristic such as race, sex, or handicap. A party asserting his or her civil rights
is claiming to have been subjected to forbidden discrimination on such a basis.
18. Act of June 25, 1948, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976).
19. 422 U.S. at 68-69.
20. Id. at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
21. The Court held at the outset that the intent to protect the plaintiff's class (cor-
porate stockholders) "was at best a subsidiary purpose" of the statute, id. at 80, and
cited legislative history to buttress that conclusion, id. at 80-83. The Court then noted
that the legislative history was silent as to any intent to create a private right and
took the legislative silence as support for its finding that no private right existed. The
claim that such a private right was consistent with the legislative scheme was rejected
in one paragraph, again with citations to the legislative history. The Court concluded
that an implied private remedy would indeed conflict with a traditional remedy under
state law. Id. at 82-84.
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why the Cort opinion marks the culmination of the dominant strand
of implication cases.22
The first Cort criterion focuses on whether the plaintiff is a mem-
ber of the class "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. '23
This criterion originated in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby,24
the first modern case in which the Supreme Court found a private right
to sue under a statute not expressly providing one.2 5 The plaintiff,
a railroad worker, sued his employer after he was injured due to the
employer's violation of a safety statute that prescribed only criminal
penalties. 26 The Court, in finding a private right to sue, pointed out
that the statute's "principal object" was the protection of railroad
workers and that the common law doctrine of statutory torts27 there-
22. Throughout this Note, references are made to the "dominant" or "major" strand
of implication cases. This is simply a generic term to tie together the great bulk of
implication cases, which, the Note argues, have only one thing in common: they are not
civil rights cases. See note 17 supra. This major strand is characterized by the approach
described in this subsection.
23. 422 U.S. at 78.
24. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
25. Arguably, the implication doctrine in the federal courts may be traced to the
landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Chief Justice
Marshall set forth one of the questions for decision: "If [Marbury] has a right, and
that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?" Id. at
162. He answered his own question: "The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right." Id. at 163. After Marbury, but still 42 years prior to Rigsby, the Court stated
that "[a] general liability created by statute without a remedy may be enforced by an
appropriate common-law action." Pollard v. Bailey, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 520, 527 (1874)
(dictum). Furthermore, even though the Supreme Court had not applied the implication
doctrine prior to Rigsby, its existence was apparently not in question. See, e.g., Thayer,
Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317, 328 (1914).
26. Suit was filed under the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, Act of March 2, 1893,
ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970)), by an employee
injured while working on a railroad car. The employer contended that the employee
had no private right of action and that the Act did not apply under the facts of the
case. 241 U.S. at 37-39. The Court found that the private right of action existed and
also held for the employee on the merits. Id. at 42-43. The Court subsequently held
that the existence of state remedies could eliminate the need for a common law action
in such a case. Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214-17 (1934); Tipton
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1936). See generally P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHsLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEM 798 (2d ed. 1973).
27. The statutory tort doctrine has been defined in relation to the law of negligence
as permitting a court to adopt "as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man" the
requirements of a statute intended:
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See generally IV. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
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fore gave rise to the private right of action.28
Many lower courts subsequently came to view the "especial benefit"
criterion as a reflection of the "statutory tort" doctrine and as the
only prerequisite to implying a private right of action.29 The Su-
preme Court permitted this broad view to stand almost without chal-
lenge3O until the 1950s and 1960s, when it added the idea that courts
should search for a legislative intent to create or to deny a private
right of action and, further, that the implication ought to be con-
sistent with effectuating the congressional purpose, that is, with right-
ing the wrong that Congress sought to address.3 ' This limited search
for congressional intent and the broader question of the underlying
purpose or "goal" would become the second and third Cort criteria.",
The Court began to examine the consistency of implication with
28. 241 U.S. at 39-40. The Court did not explicitly characterize the case as one of
"statutory tort," preferring to call it an application of the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium
(where there is a right, there is a remedy). But the Court did apply statutory tort rea-
soning. Id.; cf. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967) (con-
clusion in Rigsby "was in accordance with a general rule of the law of torts"). See also
note 29 infra (citing sources on and discussing "statutory tort" doctrine).
29. See, e.g., Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y.), af 'd, 238 F.2d 790
(2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957) (criminal statute enacted for benefit of
class implies private right of action in class member absent evidence to contrary); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (disregard of statutory
command is "a wrongful act and a tort" and actionable unless contrary legislative intent
"should appear very clearly and plainly"). The commentators have often agreed. See, e.g.,
2 L. Loss, SECURTIrEs REGULLvTIO. 942-43 (2d ed. 1961); Morris, The Relation of Criminal
Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. Rr'. 453, 453 (1933). But see Note, The Use of
Criminal Statutes in the Creation of New Torts, 48 COLUM. L. R-v. 456, 456 (1948)
(statutory tort doctrine "has not won universal acceptance").
For a discussion of whether implication under the "statutory tort" doctrine should be
limited to those statutes enacted to prohibit actions previously covered by common law
rules of negligence, compare Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision
of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 627, 631-35 (1963), with Joseph, Civil Liability
Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171, 172-74 (1964).
30. But see Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 562-67
(1930) (using legislative history and purpose to provide evidence of intent); Pennsylvania
R.R. Sys. & Allied Lines Fed'n No. 90 v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 267 U.S. 203, 216 (1925)
(implying that legislative intent is relevant). The Court also noted in dictum that federal
courts are not "restricted to the remedies available in state courts" to enforce "federal
rights." Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350 (1939). And in
its landmark decision in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Court strongly implied
that in the proper circumstances a cause of action might be implied under the Fourth
or Fifth Amendment. Id. at 683-84. Such a purely constitutional cause of action was
finally permitted under the Fourth Amendment in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
31. See note 35 infra (discussing cases).
32. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 84 (1975). Well before the Court explicitly in-
corporated legislative intent and legislative purpose into the implication test as distinct
criteria, Justice Frankfurter suggested that the distinction between them was a useless
one. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 527,
538-40 (1947).
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intent and purpose when faced with parties asserting private rights
under statutes that had created sophisticated economic regulatory
schemes. In both the 1951 case of Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v.
Northwestern Public Service Co.a3 and the 1959 case of T..M.E. Inc.
v. United States, 34 the Court refused to imply judicially enforceable
rights under regulatory statutes where there was no evidence of in-
tent to create private rights of action and where it was clear that
implication would interfere with the functioning of the administra-
tive agency charged with enforcing the statutes.35 By 1964, when the
Court decided J.1. Case Co. v. Borak,30 it was satisfied that implica-
tion would not interfere because Congress had intended to create
private rights in some circumstances and because, in any case, courts
should be alert to provide those remedies "necessary to make effec-
tive the congressional purpose."3
3. 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
34. 859 U.S. 464 (1959).
35. In Montana-Dakota the plaintiff claimed that the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791a-825r (1940) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1970)), created a private
right of action to recover damages from unreasonable utility rates. The Court observed
that the plaintiff's dilemma was to "avoid Scylla without being drawn into Charybdis":
either the action was for common law fraud and deceit, meaning it should be pursued
under state law, or it was for rates in excess of those permitted by the Act, in which
case the Federal Power Commission had exclusive ratemaking authority. 341 U.S. at
250-53. In either case, the asserted right was not a major goal of the legislation, because
there was no "right" conferred by the statute except "the right to the rate which the
Commission files or fixes." Id. at 251.
The T.I.M.E. Inc. case raised the analogous question whether the Motor Carrier Act of
1935, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), created "a judicially en-
forceable right in a shipper to be free from the exaction of unreasonable charges."
359 U.S. at 468. The Court cited Montana-Dakota in support of its finding that the
statute did not create such an enforceable right. Id. at 469. The Court then reinforced
this conclusion by looking into the legislative history and agency interpretations to
find evidence against congressional intent to create such a right. Id. at 469-72. For a
general view of the state of implication law around the time of these decisions, see
Note, supra note 2.
36. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
37. Id. at 433. It has been suggested that the Court in Borak was somewhat disin-
genuous in calling the right to sue "necessary," because other remedies were available.
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1532, 1550-51 (1972). The Supreme Court would later suggest that Borak and Rigsby
may have applied the same reasoning process:
In those cases we concluded that criminal liability was inadequate to ensure the
full effectiveness of the statute which Congress had intended. Because the interest
of the plaintiffs in those cases fell within the class that the statute was intended to
protect, and because the harm that had occurred was of the type that the statute
was intended to forestall, we held that civil actions were proper. That conclusion was
in accordance with a general rule of the law of torts.
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967). Although this amounts
in substance to a restatement of the statutory tort doctrine, it is unlikely that the Court
intended to adopt that doctrine as the sole test for implication. The Court apparently has
1384
Implied Rights of Action
The examination of intent and purpose before deciding whether
to imply private rights of action was not limited to cases involving
economic regulatory statutes. The Court evidenced a similar concern
in the early 1960s in deciding whether to imply private rights under
statutes governing the issuance of subpoenas-" and regulating labor-
management relations.39
In the 1970s the Court decided two more cases dealing with the
evidentiary weight to be given to congressional establishment of a
sophisticated regulatory scheme in addressing questions of legislative
intent and purpose. The 1974 decision in National Railroad Passen-
ger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak)40
effectively embodied a presumption against the existence of a private
right of action for every party injured by a statute's breach where
the statute explicitly provides such a right for some injured parties.
Amtrak was a suit by a group of passengers who claimed that the
Amtrak Act4 ' created a private right to sue to enjoin Amtrak from
canceling certain train routes. The Court resurrected the maxim ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius42 to support its conclusion that be-
cause the Act expressly conferred a right to sue on the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States and in some cases on employees, it could
safely be assumed that Congress did not intend to create such a right
in other private parties.43
never since made explicit use of this "test," and the reaction of the lower federal courts
was decidedly mixed. See Note, Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes-The
Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 Was. & MARY L. REv. 429, 433-35 & nn.25-27
(1976) (citing cases).
38. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650-52 (1963).
39. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 138-41 (1964). Cf. International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1963) (Congress must have intended
statutory rights to be judicially enforceable "[i]n view of the clearly stated purposes of
the [Railway Labor] Act and of its history").
40. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
41. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1910, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970).
42. "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
43. 414 U.S. at 458. In support of this maxim, the Court cited Botany Worsted Mills
v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929) (where Congress has created one remedy, courts
should not imply another). Fourteen years after deciding Botany Mills, however, the
Court had asserted that the expressio unius maxim should be applied with caution to
modern statutes. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943) (ancient
maxims of statutory construction often originated in sources "hostile" to legislative
action and must sometimes be "subordinated" to general legislative purpose and policy).
The Amtrak Court conceded that expressio unius would yield to clear evidence of a
contrary legislative intent, 414 U.S. at 458, but that was a narrower exception than
those mentioned in Joiner. Even so, the maxim is not without its modern-day adherents.
See, e.g., 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 57.10, at
428-29 (4th ed. 1973) (citing cases). For some critics of the use of expressio unius in
Amtrak, see, e.g., McMahon & Rodos, supra note 15, at 84; Comment, supra note 7, at
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The following term, in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bar-
bour,44 the Court qualified its Amtrak holding. Although the Court
called the statutory construction problems in the two cases analogous,
it did not cite Amtrak's expressio unius reasoning.4a Central to Am-
trak, said the Court, was the proposition that " 'the inference of such
a private cause of action not otherwise authorized by statute must be
consistent with the evident legislative intent and, of course, with the
effectuation of the purposes intended to be served by the Act.'-46
By the 1970s, just prior to Cort, the number of criteria facing the
plaintiff claiming a private right of action had grown from one, Rigsby's
"especial benefit," to three.4 7 In attempting to summarize the cri-
teria in Cort v. Ash, the Court added a fourth question: "[i]s the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law?" 4 Although earlier
cases had frequently referred to state law as providing the plaintiff's
cause of action,49 Cort cited no case that explicitly found that criterion
relevant to implying a cause of action based on federal law.50
The Court left unanswered the questions whether a plaintiff was
required to meet all four criteria before a private right would be
implied and, if not, which criteria carried greater weight.51 The
precedents make clear, however, that at the very least failure to meet
1417; Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial
Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORDHAM L. Rlv. 441,
445, 457 (1974).
44. 421 U.S. 412 (1975). Barbour held that a broker-dealer's customers do not have
an implied right of action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1970), to compel the Securities Investor Protection Corporation to
act on their behalf.
45. 421 U.S. at 418-21.
46. Id. at 418 (citing 414 U.S. at 457-58). The Court has not mentioned the expressio
unius maxim in any of the implication cases decided since Amtrak. Combined with
Barbour's language, this may well indicate a judicial retreat from its use. But cf. Note,
supra note 15, at 383 (Cort approach "even more restrictive" than Amtrak approach).
47. The three criteria are the questions of "especial benefit," legislative intent, and
legislative purpose. For an argument that a plaintiff is required to meet all three, see
p. 1387 infra.
48. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
49. E.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963); see Montana-Dakota Utils.
Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 250 (1951).
50. 422 U.S. at 78. But cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-99 (1976) (suggesting that
existence of state remedy is relevant to whether action is permissible under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970)); Tipton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1936) (where
state provides workmen's compensation as substitute for common law action, common
law remedy for breach of federal safety statutes need no longer be implied).
51. See Peterson, Implied Remedies Under Federal Statutes: A New Look, 80 Com.
L.J. 480, 483 (1975) (Court did not indicate whether all four criteria must be met); 47
Miss. L.J. 156, 163 (1976) (degree of test's restrictiveness unclear until lower court rulings
because Court did not indicate whether plaintiff had to satisfy all four criteria).
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the "especial benefit" criterion would defeat the private right. 52 Logi-
cally, evidence of a legislative intent contrary to permitting private
suits would also be decisive, and the Court said as much in Cort.53
Although the precedents do not fully suggest the weight to be given
to the "underlying purposes" criterion, 54 that test held considerable
sway in Cort. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court permitted that
criterion to affect the judgments concerning both the "especial benefit"
criterion and the "state law" criterion.55 The Court has since implied
that a finding that a remedy exists under state law should not be de-
cisive.50 Thus it appears that the first three criteria constitute a test
for implication, with the fourth criterion relevant if the others yield
an uncertain result. It further appears that the "underlying purposes"
criterion can have an important impact on the way in which the
others are viewed.
B. Civil Rights: A Generous Approach to Implication
Regardless of whether the test for implication promulgated in Cort
v. Ash is viewed as restrictive, a similar analysis had never been ap-
plied prior to Cort in cases in which the plaintiff sought to pro-
tect his or her civil rights. When a plaintiff has claimed an implied
right of action under a federal statute in order to remedy forbidden
discrimination, the Court has been noticeably sympathetic to the
52. See note 35 supra (discussing cases). Meeting the especial benefit criterion, on
the other hand, is not sufficient in itself. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. V.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975) (although statute enacted for benefit of plaintiff's
class, private right still not implied).
53. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975). See Peterson, supra note 51, at 482 (explicit
legislative intent not to permit private actions is controlling). Cf. National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) ("even the most basic
general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of
legislative intent").
54. Although the precedents appear to indicate that inconsistency might be sufficient
to deny a private right, they do not make clear what degree of consistency would be
enough to confer one. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412,
421 (1975) (private right of action not "necessary to or . . . capable of furthering that
[congressional] purpose"); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 461 (1974) (denial of private right "completely consistent with
the Act as a whole"); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 474 (1959) (private
right "incompatible with . . . statutory scheme").
55. The Court undertook a purpose inquiry as part of its answer ,to the "especial
benefit" question and determined that the protection of the plaintiff's class was at best
a "subsidiary purpose" of the statute. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80-81 (1975). In de-
termining whether a traditional state remedy had been displaced, the Court concluded
that relegating the plaintiff to state law would not hinder the congressional "goal." Id.
at 85.
56. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (existence of state
law remedy "not dispositive" of implication question).
1387
The Yale Law Journal
claim. Its reasoning in the civil rights cases has been similar to that
in the major strand, but the criteria have been applied in a broad,
not a restrictive, manner.57
The cases finding private rights of action under civil rights statutes
are not numerous, but they nevertheless indicate a consistently favor-
able attitude toward permitting suits under such statutes. The first
cases to imply private causes of action to protect civil rights were
the Court's 1944 decisions in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road58 and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and En-
ginemen.59 Those decisions held that black employees possessed an im-
plied right of action to sue under the Railway Labor Act to remedy
harm caused by discriminatory agreements entered into by manage-
ment and a union.60 The Court used a two-step analysis to find the
right. First, the Court found that the union had a statutory duty of
fair representation that included an implicit duty not to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race: "Congress plainly did not undertake to au-
thorize the bargaining representative to make such discriminations."'"
Second, the Court reasoned that if private suits were not permitted
the workers' right to be immune from discrimination by their rep-
resentatives "would be sacrificed or obliterated. '0 2
Although nearly a quarter of a century passed before the Supreme
Court confronted another case involving implication of a private right
of action to protect civil rights, 63 at least one court of appeals relied
57. The Court has also provided implied rights of action to protect civil liberties,
see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), and to challenge state welfare enactments, see, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970). Both of these areas involve the protection of personal rights granted by
federal statute or the Constitution, as do the civil rights cases, and the reading of Gort
suggested in this Note might profitably be applied in those areas as well.
58. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
59. 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
60. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1944).
61. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944). The Steele case is usually
cited as the origin of the doctrine of a "duty of fair representation." See, e.g., C.
SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 38-46 (1968); Wellington,
Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System,
67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1334-39 (1958).
62. 323 U.S. at 207.
63. The next civil rights case that raised the question of implication was Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). In the interim, the Court decided in 1948
to permit a private action under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), which proscribes certain types
of discrimination but provides no explicit remedies. The Court allowed the suit in an
action to forbid enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by the courts in the District
of Columbia. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30-36 (1948). Shortly before deciding Allen,
the Court extended the § 1982 remedy to reach purely private housing discrimination
as well. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (injunctive relief granted); cf.
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in the interim on the Court's Steele and Tunstall reasoning to find
an implied right. The Second Circuit in Fitzgerald v. Pan American
World Airways64 held that the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics
Act forbidding discrimination 65 granted to black passengers forced
to leave a plane due to their race an implied right to sue for damages."0
The Second Circuit explicitly noted in Pan American, as had the Su-
preme Court in both Steele and Tunstall, that the statutory remedy
was not sufficient to protect the rights granted to the plaintiffs. " The
problem in Steele and Tunstall was the employees' inability to trigger
the statutory remedy; in Pan American, the Civil Aeronautics Board
was incapable of making the plaintiffs whole. 8
By the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court was taking a generally restric-
tive view of implication where an administrative enforcement mech-
anism existed. 9 But the Court's 1969 decision in Allen v. State Board
of Elections70 made clear that this restrictive view would not be ex-
tended to civil rights cases. In Allen the Court held that individual
voters had an implied right to challenge local voting enactments under
section five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,71 notwithstanding the
Act's explicit grant of enforcement authority to the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States.72 The Court concluded that a private
right of action should be implied because the Attorney General's
limited resources made the explicit statutory remedy inadequate: "The
achievement of the Act's laudable goal could be severely hampered...
if each citizen were required to depend solely on litigation instituted
at the discretion of the Attorney General." 73
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (damages also available). The
Court declined at least one opportunity to hear another case involving implication to
enforce civil rights when, in 1964, it denied certiorari to review a Fifth Circuit holding
that the United States had no implied right to sue local boards of education for seg-
regating children of local military personnel. United States v. Madison County Bd.
of Educ., 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964). The Madison County
decision was a refusal to imply a public, not a private, right of action and is thus not
inconsistent with a broad right to sue for individuals who have been subject to
discrimination.
64. 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
65. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, §§ 404(b), 902(a), 1106, 49 U.S.C. §§ 484(b), 622(a),
676 (1940) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970)).
66. 229 F.2d at 501-02.
67. Id. at 502.
68. Id.
69. See pp. 1383-86 supra.
70. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970).
72. Id.; see 393 U.S. at 554-57. See generally Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act: The Formation of an Extraordinary Federal Remedy, 22 Am. U.L. REV. 111, 116-17
(1972).
73. 393 U.S. at 556 (footnote omitted).
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Allen clarifies the distinction between the dominant strand and the
civil rights cases: whereas in Borak the private right of action was
implied because it was "necessary,"74 it was enough in Allen that with-
out the private remedy the Act's effectiveness would be "severely ham-
pered." 75 The emphasis in Allen was on extending the broadest pos-
sible protections to the plaintiffs' federally protected right to be free
from discrimination; without the private right, the Court said, the
statute's guarantees "might well prove an empty promise." 70
The distinction between the two strands of cases was brought into
stark relief in 1974 when, just twelve days after restricting in Amtrak
the test for implication in the main strand, the Court decided Lau
v. Nichols.77 Lau permitted a private suit under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 196478 to force a school district receiving federal funds
to comply with regulations prohibiting recipients from discriminating
on the basis of race.79 The school district argued in its brief that no
private right existed, 0 but the Court did not even discuss the ques-
tion, despite the fact that Title VI and the regulations promulgated
under it expressly provided for an administrative enforcement mecha-
nism.8' Instead, the Court simply stated that it was relying on Title
VI12 and held for the plaintiffs on the merits.8 3 Although it has been
argued that Lau was not in fact a case involving a private right of
action, 4 it has certainly been read as one.8s
74. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
75. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969).
76. Id. at 557.
77. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). Lau was decided on January 21, 1974; Amtrak was decided
on January 9, 1974.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
79. 414 U.S. at 564-66.
80. Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 7
("Respondents ... contend that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act
do not give a party a federal cause of action every time a School District fails to resolve
a problem-not of its own making-presented to it by a student." (emphasis added)).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
82. 414 U.S. at 566. The plaintiffs also claimed violations of the equal protection
clause. Id. at 565. The cause of action was founded at least in part on 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). Plaintiffs' Complaint for Injunction and Declaratory Relief at 4, Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974). See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1077, 1083 n.7 (7th
Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1977) (No. 77-926).
83. 414 U.S. at 566-69.
84. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1077, 1083 (7th Cir. 1977), petition
for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1977) (No. 77-926), discussed at pp. 1393-96,
1400-07 infra.
85. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1280 (7th Cir. 1977);
Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 1974); Barnes v. Con-
verse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D.S.C. 1977); Shelton & Berndt, supra note 3, at
1157. Even before Lau, numerous lower courts had permitted private rights of action
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Thus it is clear that in civil rights cases, in contrast with most
other types, the mere existence of an administrative enforcement
mechanism does not bar implication of private rights of action.8" Un-
der the Cort test, such a mechanism may be evidence of an intent to
exclude a private right, as well as of inconsistency of a private right
with the statute's purpose.87 But in civil rights cases, the Court has
paused to test the adequacy of the enforcement mechanisms in protect-
ing the plaintiffs' civil rights against the statute's broad underlying
purpose of protecting those rights. Furthermore, because many of
the cases in the two strands are essentially contemporaneous, the
differences in their approach cannot be explained simply in terms
of the Court's changing philosophy; 8 the distinction seems instead
to revolve around the nature of the rights involved. As one commen-
to enforce the guarantees of Title VI against private parties. See, e.g., Bossier Parish
School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
See note 148 infra (legislative history of Section 504 supports notion of private right of
action under Title VI and Title IX).
86. Another area in which the existence of an administrative review mechanism does
not bar private suits is in welfare law. The broad approach to implication under civil
rights statutes identified in this Note is in fact little different from the broad approach
the Supreme Court has taken to various administrative law doctrines in cases involving
welfare recipients seeking to challenge state welfare regulations as inconsistent with
federal law and thus as violative of their federal rights. In such cases the Court has
permitted the plaintiffs to circumvent virtually the entire panoply of doctrines that
usually insulates administrative regulation from interference through private suits. See
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1970). The Court said that the administrative
review mechanisms available to welfare recipients are inadequate primarily because the
recipient cannot trigger review of the state regulatory scheme. Id. at 406 n.8. See Herzer,
Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
1, 9-12 (1970) (discussing policy); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Prac-
tices, 67 COLum. L. REV. 84, 91-92, 102 (1967) (discussing inadequacy of HEW's adminis-
trative review mechanisms).
The administrative law doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," waived in Rosado, developed
for much the same purpose as did the restrictive view of implication under statutes pro-
viding for administrative enforcement: protection of the integrity and uniformity of the
regulatory schemes set up by Congress by deferring to the judgment of the regulators
selected by Congress. See generally 3 K. DAvis, Antmils-rParivE LAw TrEArisE § 19.02,
at 7 (1958). The Court made exceptions for welfare recipients because they asserted
personal federal rights that the available administrative remedy could not protect. 397
U.S. at 406. Logically, the Court should take a similarly broad view of implication for
plaintiffs in civil rights cases, who assert similar rights and face an even greater barrier,
given the administrative discretion embodied in many enforcement schemes.
87. This was the holding of Amtrak, the case cited in Cart for the "intent" criterion.
See pp. 1385-86.
88. See, e.g., Deutsch & LaRue, Federalism and the Law of Securities Regulation:
The Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 34 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 799, 807-08 (1977)
(suggesting private right found in Borak would survive under strict application of Cort
v. Ash analysis). If this is true, then Borak is not easily written off as a product of
the Warren Court's liberalism, nor Cort v. Ash as a product of the Burger Court's
conservatism. But see McMahon & Rodos, supra note 15, at 167-68, 190-92 (restrictive
view of implication is due to Burger Court's conservatism).
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tator has put it, the "implied remedy path into federal court is a
narrow one, but if there is any lesson to be learned from the Supreme
Court's racial discrimination decisions of the past two decades, it is
that the Court will give the broadest sweep possible to congressional
statutes aimed at racial equality."8' 9
II. Civil Rights Law after Cort v. Ash
The Supreme Court's attempt in Cort v. Ash to restate the law of
implication failed to indicate any explicit limitations on the types
of cases within the doctrine's scope. Perhaps as a result, many lower
federal courts have applied the Cort criteria as a restrictive test for
implication even in suits claiming private rights of action to redress
forbidden discrimination.90 This approach is misguided. There are
important reasons of policy and tradition not to let the potential re-
strictiveness of the criteria applicable to the major line of cases un-
dercut the broad scope of the implication doctrine that has prevailed
until now in civil rights cases.
A. Cort v. Ash and Civil Rights in the Lower Courts
Since Cort v. Ash lower courts faced with the question whether
to imply a private right of action under a statute not expressly pro-
viding one have generally applied that opinion's "relevant" criteria
as a four-pronged test. They have permitted a private right of action
only where a plaintiff has demonstrated that all four criteria either
are neutral or favor implication.91 Several courts have even read Am-
89. Karst, Federal Remedies, 54 U. DEr. J. URB. L., 1025, 1030 (1977). It appears that
Karst and Shelton & Berndt, supra note 3, are the only commentators to suggest that
civil rights statutes should be treated any differently from others in the implication
equation. Professor Karst made only the broad statement quoted, without elaboration;
Shelton & Berndt did not make this suggestion explicitly, but it follows from their con-
tention that there are "weighty policies favoring implication" where the statute's
"dominant purpose" is to forbid discrimination. Shelton & Berndt, supra note 3, at 1158.
90. Compare Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd
on rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438
(U.S. Dec. 28, 1977) (No. 77-926) (private right under Title IX denied); People's Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482, 490-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (private right
under Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 denied) and Cape v. Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732, 738 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) (private right under Title IX denied) with Lloyd
v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1977) (private right under
Section 504 implied); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919,
924-25 (D. Del. 1977) (private right under Section 504 implied) and Silva v. East Provi-
dence Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp. 453, 465 (D.R.I. 1976) (private right under Low-Rent
Housing Act implied).
91. See note 90 supra (citing cases denying private rights); pp. 1386-87 supra (discussing
Cort as test). Since its opinion in Cort, the Supreme Court has treated the criteria as a
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trak's expressio unius reasoning into Cort, and this has resulted in
denials of private rights of action to combat racial discrimination
in housing,12 sex discrimination in high school athletics,9 3 and sex dis-
crimination in professional school admissions.
94
Probably the most important decision to date is the Seventh Cir-
cuit's holding in Cannon v. University of Chicago.93 Cannon involved
a suit by a female applicant who, having been denied admission to
a private medical school, claimed that the denial was due to her sex.96
The major claim for relief97 was under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which forbids discrimination on the basis of sex
in most educational programs receiving federal funds.98
The plaintiff contended that Title IX creates a private right of
action. But the Seventh Circuit, citing Cort v. Ash, held that no such
private right of action had been conferred.99 The Cannon litigation
was before the court of appeals twice.100 The first time the panel read
the Supreme Court's opinions in Amtrak (including the expressio
unius maxim), Barbour, and Cort together as creating a presumption
against a private right of action.' 0 ' The Seventh Circuit distinguished
Lau on the grounds that, although Title IX's language and enforcement
"test"-although perhaps not the only test-for implying a private right of action.
Twice, it has discussed the Cort factors in denying a private right. See Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-79 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1,
37-41 (1977).
92. People's Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482, 493-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). But cf. Silva v. East Providence Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp. 453, 464-66
(D.R.I. 1976) (even where provision for administrative enforcement exists, private right
implied for potential low-income tenants to challenge decision not to construct pre-
viously planned housing project).
93. Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) (implied right under Tide
IX denied). But cf. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th
Cir. 1974) (question of implied right of action not reached because discrimination on
basis of sex violated Fourteenth Amendment).
94. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd on rehearing,
559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1977), petition*'for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Dec. 28,
1977) (No. 77-926).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1067.
97. Id. at 1071-72.
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (Supp. V 1975). The statute states, in pertinent part: "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. § 1681(a). See also note 148
infra (legislative history).
99. 559 F.2d at 1073-74.
100. See id. at 1077.
101. Id. at 1074: "The teaching of Amtrak, [Barbour] and Cort . . . is that a private
cause of action should not be lightly implied under a statute where Congress has not
specifically provided one .... "
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provisions are completely analogous to those of Title VI, Lau was a
class action on behalf of a large number of students, whereas in Cannon
there was only a single plaintiff.10 2
After the first Cannon decision the panel, expressing concern that
Lau v. Nichols might have been misconstrued in its initial opinion,103
granted a petition for rehearing.104 The panel also considered on re-
hearing whether the Attorney's Fees Act,103 which granted federal
courts power to award attorney's fees in actions to enforce Title IX,
indicated a congressional intent to create a private right of action
under Title IX.1 6 The panel rejected the Attorney's Fees Act claim.107
It then proceeded to discuss Cort in greater detail, but again the court
ultimately was persuaded by its earlier reading of Amtrak: Congress
had provided for enforcement through administrative review by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the federal courts
should not imply another. 08 The panel went on to attempt to
distinguish Lau v. Nichols on the ground that the cause of action
in that case was in fact provided by section 1983,10 and not by Title
VI directly. 110 The Cannon opinion thus placed the Amtrak stumbling
102. Id. at 1072 (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)). See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 1974)
(key to Lau was number of students involved). In other words, so the argument runs,
plaintiffs who are only part of a larger class of discriminatees have a claim that a
court will enforce, but a plaintiff who is an individual has no such claim. That seems
a particularly unlikely result for Congress to have intended or even considered.
103. 559 F.2d at 1077.
104. Id. at 1077. After the petition was granted, but before the rehearing, a second
panel in the Seventh Circuit decided in Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d
1277 (7th Cir. 1977), that a private right of action existed under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975), which forbids dis-
crimination on the basis of handicap in federally funded programs, and which has
language and enforcement provisions tracking those of both Title VI and Title IX.
All three statutes by their terms put their emphasis on the persons whom they protect
(Title VI and Title IX protect every "person" from discrimination, and section 504
protects every "otherwise qualified handicapped individual"), and not on the programs
receiving funds. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare uses the same en-
forcement procedures for all three statutes. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-80.9 (1976).
Dicta in the Lloyd opinion indicated that panel's doubt about the Cannon result.
548 F.2d at 1287. But although the Cannon panel distinguished Lloyd on rehearing, it
did not discuss that case in any detail. 559 F.2d at 1082.
105. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90
Stat. 2641 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
106. 559 F.2d at 1077-80.
107. Id. But see note 148 infra (discussing Act's legislative history).
108. 559 F.2d at 1081. The panel also said that it failed to see what good private
suits would do. Id. at 1074-75.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
110. 559 F.2d at 1081-83 & nn.6-7. Such an argument asserts that an individual has
a private right of action because of § 1983 to enforce Title VI and similar statutes where
his or her benefits from the federal government are distributed through public agencies,
but that there is no private right of action where the same benefits flow through private
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block of expressio unius in the path of civil rights litigants, even
though it is no longer clear that the expressio doctrine applies in
any implication cases."'
Other cases that have attempted to apply Cort v. Ash to civil rights
statutes have not gone into as much detail as Cannon.1 2 It remains
clear, however, that so long as the Cort analysis is applied restrictively
to civil rights statutes, most plaintiffs seeking private rights will con-
tinue to be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 1 3 The
organizations. To make such an argument, it is necessary to infer that Congress, in
enacting Title VI and similar statutes, sought to create two classes of beneficiaries of
federal funds. The first class of beneficiaries would be able to seek judicial relief for
their personal harm, thus satisfying the statutory command that they not be excluded.
The second class would only have the right to seek to have the federal government
terminate funding to the program that had excluded them. But this second group of
beneficiaries could never, absent a private action, be made whole for the personal
injury they had suffered. As a result, the statutory guarantee that "[n]o person" should
be subjected to discrimination in the program would extend only to some of the
beneficiaries, with the key distinction becoming the identity of the defendant in the
action. This anomaly was pointed out by a federal magistrate in Alexander v. Yale,
C. No. N-77-277, slip op. at 9 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 1977):
It naturally has been suggested that such Title VI cases have been against "public"
defendants and therefore strictly rest on the Civil Rights Act's grant of the right
to sue for a deprivation under color of state law "of any rights . . . secured by
the Constitution and laws," 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Cannon . . . at 1083. If so, it
could hardly be a principled distinction that one student would be at Yale and
another at the University of Connecticut; if the state college student can secure
judicial relief under § 1983, the more reason to imply a suit right [sic] for the
identically situated private university student ....
In other words, the § 1983 distinction may be viewed as an argument in favor of im-
plication. Common sense does not demand the conclusion that Congress intended to
grant special protection to private parties wishing to use federal funds to discriminate.
See also note 145 infra (implication question may not be so much what legislature did
intend as what it would have intended had it considered problem).
One commentator has also suggested that even where § 1983 creates the plaintiff's
cause of action, the federal court must still determine whether he has a federal "right"
under some other statute. Mowe, Federal Statutes and Implied Private Actions, 55 OR.
L. REv. 3, 7 n.31 (1976). This has the flavor of an argument concerning standing, not
implication. See note 7 supra.
111. See note 46 supra (suggesting that expressio unius may no longer be law). By
its use of expressio unius, Cannon raised what amounted to a presumption against a
private right of action where Congress had provided any enforcement mechanism. This
is a stricter view than that taken in Amtrak, which introduced expressio lunius into
the jurisprudence of implication. In Amtrak the statute not only created an adminis-
trative enforcement mechanism but also a private right of action in some parties. See
p. 1385 supra. Thus the test Cannon applied to this civil rights action was more restrictive
than the prevailing test in the major strand.
112. See note 90 supra (citing cases). One court did state that it was "in agree-
ment with" the Cannon opinion's holding. Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732, 738 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 793 (6th
Cir. 1977). Although the Cape court refused to imply a private right of action under
Title IX, it nevertheless found for the plaintiffs on the merits of the alternative cause of
action, which was founded on the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 742-44.
113. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 649, 652 (1963) (dismissal for failure to
state cause of action is proper course where implied right of action is asserted but not
permitted).
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Cannon reasoning at the very least would deny private rights of ac-
tion under Title VI and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,11 both of which are analogous to Title IX in language and
enforcement provisions, and might even deny the private right under
the Voting Rights Act found in Allen. 5
B. Cort v. Ash, Judicial Intent, and Tradition
Federal courts that have mechanically applied the Cort v. Ash criteria
restrictively in testing for a private right of action under civil rights
statutes have failed either to discern or at least to mention the dif-
ference in the way the Supreme Court has treated the two strands of
implication cases. 116 Yet there is no reason to assume-and some rea-
son to doubt-that the Supreme Court intended Cort to operate re-
strictively on private rights of action for enforcement of civil rights
statutes. In briefing the question whether the statute at issue created
an implied private right of action, neither party to the Cort litigation
cited any cases involving civil rights. 11 More important, neither the
Cort opinion nor the other recent implication cases have discussed the
civil rights strand at any length, although Justice Marshall's opinion
114. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
115. The statute at issue in Allen provided for administrative enforcement through
the Attorney General. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). Under the Cannon reasoning, this
would seem almost sufficient in itself to bar implication.
116. But see People's Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482, 488-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). The People's Housing opinion contended that two strands of implica-
tion cases in fact existed, but traced their differences to the court's view of the source
of the right. Drawing at least in part on Comment, supra note 7, at 1412, the People's
Housing court explained the distinction as follows:
The distinction between these two approaches stems from differing conceptions as
to the source of a court's power to create a private right of action . . . . Thus, one
line of cases is governed by the belief that the judiciary's power in this area is,
for the most part, incidental to that of Congress in enacting the legislation; therefore,
no private right of action should be inferred unless there is an indication from the
legislative history or from the language of the statute itself that Congress intended
such to be the case ...
The second line of cases is oriented towards the allowance of individual suits;
in these precedents, the courts justified their ability to "legislate" private actions
as being inherent in their power, as courts of common law, to fashion appropriate
redress for intrusion upon federal rights.
425 F. Supp. at 489. The court was not identifying the same two strands as this Note;
the court cited Amtrak and Barbour as supporting the first strand, and cited Rigsby,
Bivens and Borak to support the second strand. Cort was interpreted as an attempt to
reconcile the two strands. Id. at 490.
117. See Brief for Petitioners at 20-74, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The respondents
did cite Allen, but not to contend that there would be a discrepancy between an adverse
ruling and the Allen result. Instead, they cited it as the second of three cases in a
string cite for a proposition that was not explicitly discussed in Allen, that is, implica-
tion of a cause of action is sometimes necessary as a "deterrent." Brief for Respondents
at 21, id.
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for the Court in Barbour made dear that Allen was not being over-
ruled.118
Allen, Steele, Tunstall, and Lau might all have been decided dif-
ferently under a strict application of the Cort reasoning; if Allen
remains good law, as it apparently does,"19 this is not so because the
logic of Cort inexorably demands it. The statute in Allen provided
explicitly for administrative enforcement. There was no finding that
a private cause of action was "necessary," only that enforcement would
be "severely hampered" without it. Similarly, Congress had created
administrative agencies to enforce the statutes at issue in Steele, Tun-
stall, Pan American, and Lau, but that did not bar the finding of
an implied right of action. Under the restrictive view of Cort exem-
plified by Cannon, no private right would have existed.12 0 Yet Lau
v. Nichols was decided by a unanimous Court the term before Cort
and just twelve days after Amtrak.
In addition to doubts that may be raised concerning the Court's
intention to restrict implication under civil rights statutes as well as
under other types, strong policy reasons support a more expansive
approach to private rights of action for enforcement of civil rights.
In the civil rights area, there is no danger that implication will prove
inconsistent with the statute's underlying purposes. A civil rights stat-
ute usually has the comprehensive purpose of eliminating some form
of discrimination. Thus there is no need for a court to balance the
individual rights asserted under the statute against a broader interest
that the statute also seeks to protect. The protection of such individual
rights is exactly the broader interest the statute seeks to further.12
In addition, a court faced with the decision whether to imply a
118. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423-25 (1975).
119. See id.
120. Steele, Tunstall, and Lau all found private rights of action under statutes that
included explicit provisions for administrative remedies, see pp. 1388-89 supra; under the
restrictive view of the Cort analysis exemplified by Cannon, this alone would be suf-
ficient to deny the private right of action. The plaintiffs in Steele and Tunstall would
have at least some difficulty circumventing the very first Cort criterion, which asks
whether the plaintiffs are members of the class for whose "especial" benefit the statute
was enacted. The Railway Labor Act was enacted to benefit all union members, not
merely black ones, and the provisions that create the duty of fair representation do
not say anything explicit about racial discrimination. See Railway Labor Act, § 2, as
amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151a-152 (1970).
121. For example, in the area of economic regulation, even if the statute was en-
acted for the plaintiff's "especial benefit," a private suit could still interfere with uniform
regulation that Congress intended and hence be inconsistent with the underlying pur-
poses. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975).
In the civil rights area, the underlying purpose is only to extend the fullest possible
protection to the rights of the plaintiff. See pp. 1401-06 infra.
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private right under a civil rights statute will rarely need to puzzle,
as did the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, over the litigant's status as
a "primary" or "secondary" beneficiary of the statute.12 2 Most civil
rights statutes make clear by their terms the class or classes that they
seek to protect from discrimination, 12-' and whether the class is de-
fined along racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual lines, the plaintiff's
membership in it usually is easily discerned. 1 -
Even when an administrative enforcement mechanism exists under
a civil rights statute, its relation to the statutorily created rights is
less pervasive than in the area of regulatory statutes. Under economic
regulatory legislation, the rights of the statute's beneficiaries may be
intended to be dependent on administrative discretion, 125 but civil
rights are not limited by such discretion. 126 For example, in the Mon-
122. In Cort the importance of whether the rights sought to be vindicated were the
"primary" or "secondary" object of the statute was emphasized. 422 U.S. at 80-85. Accord,
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977).
123. It may be argued that this statement demands something of a leap of faith.
Statutes such as Title VI and Title IX, which tie their protections against discrimination
to the receipt of federal funds by the putative discriminator, might be read as being
intended only to save federal funds from taint. See, e.g., Shelton & Berndt, supra note 3,
at 1154 n.200. At least as regards Title VI (which was the model for Title IX), the
question has been persuasively answered by the Justice Department:
Section 601 [Title VI] creates personal rights. It provides that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, 1 * * be excluded" from participation
in any federally-assisted program. The rights created by Section 601 run in favor
of every person. Congress could as easily have provided that: "No program dis-
criminating on account of race shall receive federal funds." If it had expressed the
prohibition in that way, there would be a strong argument that [individuals] . . .
could not bring suit. But the statute actually enacted was far broader; it instructs
recipients of federal money not to discriminate. It was designed to end discrimination,
not simply to allocate federal money to programs that did not discriminate.
Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 28-29, Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, No. 76-811 (U.S. 1977) (footnotes omitted). In short, the statutory
language of the "spending-power" civil rights statutes indicates by its emphasis the
congressional intent to confer rights on individuals. This conclusion is buttressed, in
the case of Title IX, by the legislative history discussed in notes 140 & 148 inIra.
124. Membership in the protected group is more difficult to discern when a plaintiff
asserts that he is a victim of what some commentators have called "reverse discrimination"
-that is, that remedial programs designed to assist victims of discrimination in turn
violate his statutory or constitutional rights to be free of discrimination. In a case before
the Supreme Court this term challenging the validity of a public university's affirmative
action program in admissions, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553
P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977) (No. 76-811), the
Court requested both parties to the case to file briefs discussing Title VI as it applies
to the case, 98 S. Ct. 293 (1977), and granted permission for the Solicitor General of the
United States to do so, id. at 500. Thus the Court may be preparing to decide whether
a private right of action exists under Title VI in this situation. Cf. Flanagan v. President
& Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377, 378 (D.D.C. 1976) (permitting, without
discussing jurisdictional issues, private suit under Title VI to challenge private college's
practice of granting preference to members of minority groups in awarding financial aid).
125. See, e.g., note 35 supra (discussing cases).
126. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 8- n.21 (1969) (Attorney
General's discretion in enforcement suggests need for private rights).
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tana-Dakota and T.I.M.E. Inc. cases a party claimed a statutory "right"
to a certain rate for utility services, but the Court replied that the
only "right" was to the rate fixed by the appropriate federal regula-
tory commission. 127 By way of contrast, the plaintiffs in Allen were
guaranteed the right to be free from all voting enactments diminishing
minority voting strength, not only from those the Attorney General
chose to challenge. 128
In addition, civil rights statutes may be enacted to protect consti-
tutional rights. 209 The Court made clear in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' ° that private rights
of action to protect individual rights secured under the Constitution
are favored.' 3 ' Thus to the extent that suits under some civil rights
statutes are in fact efforts to enforce constitutional rights, the second
Cort criterion, a limited search for legislative intent, is less important;
the provisions of the Constitution, unlike those of a statute, were
intended to change meaning with changing times. 3 2
Finally, private litigation in federal court has long been recognized
as an important tool for the furtherance of the goal of equality. As
Judge Friendly has noted, "[i]t is hard to conceive a task more ap-
propriate for federal courts than to protect civil rights."'133 Histori-
cally, it has been not the Congress or the executive but the Supreme
Court acting at the behest of private litigants that has struck down
official and private segregation of many sorts.134 The Court recognized
127. T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 468 (1959); Montana-Dakota Utils.
Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 250-53 (1951).
128. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 n.21 (1969). But cf. Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (implying that some voting enactments may
violate Constitution but not violate Voting Rights Act; only those that reduce minority
voting strength clearly violate Act).
129. Although this argument is fairly clear in the case of statutes combatting racial
discrimination, such as Title VI and the Voting Rights Act, it is more difficult-although
not impossible-to argue that either Title IX, attacking sex discrimination in education,
or Section 504, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap, was enacted to pro-
tect constitutional rights. But see Comment, Plessy Revived: The Separate But Equal
Doctrine and Sex-Segregated Education, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 585 (1977) (arguing
that sex discrimination in education violates Fourteenth Amendment).
130. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
131. Id. at 391-97.
132. Constitutional interpretation is a completely different process from ordinary statu-
tory construction. Traditionally, a judge interpreting the Constitution will bear in mind
that its meaning was intended to change with the times, in contradistinction to the
meaning of a statute. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
133. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JuRIsDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 90 (1973).
134. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (desegregating courtrooms);
New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958), a!f'g per curiam
252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) (desegregating public parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956), aff'g per curiarn 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (three-judge court) (desegregating
public transportation); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacating per curiam
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well over a decade ago that in the civil rights context "litigation is
not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for
achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all gov-
ernment, federal, state and local."' 3 5
To the extent that implication involves a search for congressional
intent, it seems unlikely that a Congress involved in enacting legisla-
tion for the preservation of civil rights would seek to strip the courts
of the paramount role they have traditionally played in preserving
those rights.18 More likely, the administrative enforcement processes
are intended to supplement the judicial enforcement that has long
characterized the civil rights area.
III. Cort Properly Applied: The Example of Title IX
The criteria for finding a private right of action set forth in Cort
v. Ash, standing alone, do not seem anything other than neutral.137
It is only the manner in which the Court has used the criteria that
may properly be labeled restrictive. Properly qualified to reflect the
broad purpose underlying civil rights statutes, the Cort criteria can
be applied to preserve the favorable view of implication that tradi-
tionally has characterized this field. A reexamination of Cannon will
serve to illustrate how Cort should be applied to civil rights cases.
The first inquiry pursued in Cort was whether the plaintiff was
"one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,"
that is, whether "the statute create[s] a federal right in favor of the
223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (desegregating public golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), afj'g per curiam 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (desegregating
beaches); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (desegregating public education);
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (outlawing restrictive covenants); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (invalidating statute that excluded blacks from jury service).
135. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). Accord, S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 212 (1971); Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of
Negro Freedom Revisited: Some First Thoughts On Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company,
22 RUTGERS L. REV. 537, 549-52 (1968).
136. Congress may, however, intend administrative remedies to relieve courts of part
of their burden of being the sole enforcer of civil rights, and to relieve those who have
been subjected to discrimination of the financial burdens often accompanying litigation.
See Note, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 207, 213 n.70 (1975) (quoting Sen. Bayh). Nevertheless this
would leave the two types of remedies-judicial and administrative-to supplement, not
to supplant, one another. See Karst, supra note 89, at 1062.
137. The criteria may be viewed as restrictive rather than neutral if they are seen
as four (or possibly three, see pp. 1386-87 supra) separate weapons any one of which
can defeat a cause of action. But some courts have made an effort to apply the test
neutrally, setting forth the criteria with no analysis of how they were used in Cort.
See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-87 (7th Cir. 1977); Rauch
v. United Instruments, 405 F. Supp. 435, 438-41 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 548 F.2d 452
(3d Cir. 1976).
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plaintiff."' 38 In Cannon the Seventh Circuit stated that it would as-
sume arguendo that the plaintiff, a woman claiming sex discrimination
in professional school admissions, was within the protections of Title
IX. 1 1 This statement seems disingenuous, since it is easy to see that
Title IX was intended to protect women in the plaintiff's position. 40
In approaching this threshold question in the civil rights context,
the court should concentrate on determining the discrimination that
Congress sought to end, the group it sought to protect,' 4' whether
the plaintiff is a member of the group, and whether the plaintiff
alleges precisely that discrimination. In many cases the language of
the statute alone will be sufficient to answer these questions, 1 42 al-
though inquiry into legislative history may also be necessary.' 43 In
making these determinations, the court may be influenced by the
statute's broad purpose.' 44
Second, Cort asks whether there is "any indication of legislative in-
tent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one."' -1 In Cort the legislative silence on the matter was taken as
138. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
139. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for
cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438 (Dec. 28, 1977) (No. 77-926).
140. The words of the statute are clear and unambiguous on this point: "in regard
to admissions to educational institutions, this section [the prohibition on discrimination]
shall apply . . . to institutions of . . . professional education." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)
(Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). The legislative history is also clear. The principal
sponsor of the amendment that became Title IX, Senator Birch Bayh, said during the
debates that the amendment "tries to speak directly in regard to women students who
do want access to institutions." 118 CONG. REC. 5813 (1972). He also called it "an im-
portant first step in the effort to provide for the women of America something that is
rightfully theirs-an equal chance to attend the schools of their choice." Id. at 5808
(emphasis added).
141. Usually it will be clear what group Congress sought to protect. The question
may be less clear under the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, where the number
of "suspect" classes has proliferated. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 763-85 (9th ed. 1975).
142. See, e.g., note 123 supra (discussing Title VI).
143. It appears that the Court has only once undertaken a major examination of the
legislative history of a civil rights statute in the implication context to determine whether
the plaintiff was within its intended ambit. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
422-37 (1968) (arguing from legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) that that section
was meant to protect black buyers from discriminatory private refusals to sell real estate).
144. The purpose inquiry was permitted to influence the search in Cort for evidence
of whether the plaintiffs were among the statute's "especial" beneficiaries. Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 80-82 (1975).
145. Id. at 78. It is somewhat inaccurate to pose the problem of implication pri-
marily, or even largely, in terms of determining the legislative intent. When the legis-
lative intent is clear, there is no need for a sophisticated test; such a test really only
comes into use when the legislative history is silent. See Albert, supra note 3, at 452-56;
Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 539. Cf. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 262 (1973) (when
legislative history is silent, court must determine what legislature "would have decided"
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an indication that no private right should be implied.140 The Cannon
court, too, found the legislative history silent and followed Cort in
reading the legislative silence as supporting its conclusion that no
private right of action existed. 147 The Cannon court may well have
been too hasty in deciding that the legislative history was silent.148
had it "addressed the issue"); Note, supra note 2, at 291 (court may be in better position
than was legislature at time of enactment to assess need for private civil remedy). Indeed,
the clearer the legislative intent, the less discretion is involved in the decision whether
to imply a private right of action-and the less need there is for the other three parts
of the Cort test. Cf. Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D.S.C. 1977)
(legislative intent to create private right was explicit, so no test for implication applied).
146. 422 U.S. at 82-84.
147. 559 F.2d at 1081-82. The Cannon court blended the existence of what it called
a "sophisticated" administrative remedy with Amtrak's expressio unius reasoning to infer
a legislative intent not to permit alternative enforcement schemes. See pp. 1383-84 & note
101 supra (discussing this inference).
148. There is at least some evidence that during the debates over the amendment that
would become Title IX, some members of Congress were thinking in terms of suits by
individuals. Senator Bayh, the amendment's chief sponsor, was asked whether in his
view Title IX "means that a private school for girls, for the sake of argument, would
have to accept men teachers, or vice versa?" He replied: "Someone would have to prove
that they did discriminate against teachers [on the basis of sex] first." Asked whether
a boys' prep school would have to hire women faculty members, Senator Bayh stated:
"[I]f discrimination can be proven, the answer is 'Yes.'" 118 CONG. REc. 5813 (1972)
(Sens. Pell and Bayh) (emphasis added). Although Senator Bayh could have been re-
ferring in these remarks to the administrative review process within the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, his language seems more appropriate for the discussion
of lawsuits. When discussing the power of administrative agencies, Senator Bayh spoke
in terms of compliance with regulations rather than proof of discrimination. Id. at 5807.
The Cannon court on rehearing also discussed the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988), which by its terms provides for the discretionary award
of attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs in "any action or proceeding to enforce" Title
IX. The court found in the legislative history evidence that Congress at the time of the
Act's enactment was aware of the first Cannon holding that Title IX did not create a
private right of action and did not seek to overturn it. 559 F.2d at 1079-80. The same
legislative history, however, also indicates that the Act's sponsors went out of their way
to make clear that they were not endorsing the Cannon holding. Pressed repeatedly to
state whether they intended through the Attorney's Fees Act to create a private right
of action under Title IX, the Act's sponsors answered only with vague and ambiguous
assurances and apparently tried to avoid either endorsing or opposing the Cannon result.
Representative Drinan said that the Act would make "no change in the substantive
preexisting law in this case before the body at this time. We accept preexisting law,
whatever it is." Representative Railsback added:
I would simply like to point out that, as I understand it, it is clearly not the intent
of Congress to create a new remedy, but that, rather, this bill would create a remedy
only in the event that the courts should in the future determine that an individual
may sue under the statutes.
And the bill does not authorize or statutorily grant any private right of action
which does not now exist.
Representative Drinan said he concurred "completely." 122 CONG. REc. H12153 (daily
ed., Oct. 1, 1976) (Reps. Drinan and Railsback). He then went on to say that the Act
would cover "any action, including suits by individuals, instituted under title IX." Id.
at H12159 (Rep. Drinan) (emphasis supplied). In short, although the legislative history
makes clear that Congress did not attempt in enacting the Attorney's Fees Act to over-
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But even if correct, the panel should not have used the legislative
silence as it did. Such an interpretation of legislative silence may
make sense if a court is taking a restrictive view of implication, but
it is by no means the only possible interpretation. 149 In the civil
rights cases the Court has found it unnecessary to search the legisla-
tive history for affirmative signs of intent to create a private right of
action. The Court has focused instead on Congress's clear intention
to grant the broadest possible protection to civil rights, 150 and it has
noted the difficulty of fulfilling that purpose without implication of
private rights of action.' 3 ' Title IX's clear intent, the protection of
women in federally assisted educational programs, 152 would be equally
difficult to attain without a private right.'53 Thus a court applying
the second Cort criterion to a civil rights statute should seek to de-
termine how a private right will contribute to enforcing the pro-
tections Congress intended to extend before deciding what weight
to accord to legislative silence on the question of private rights .'
4
The third of Justice Brennan's Cort criteria asks whether it is "con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to im-
turn the Cannon holding, it makes equally clear that the bill's sponsors took pains not
to endorse the decision.
There is also support for the notion that a private right exists under Title IX in the
legislative history of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975). See Summary of the Committee Substitute [Amendment of
Section 504], 120 CONG. REC. 30532, 30534 (1974) ("The section was patterned after,
and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language of [Title VI] and [Title IX]
... . [I]mplementation of section 504, which closely follows the models of the above-
cited anti-discrimination provisions, would . . . permit a judicial remedy through a
private action.")
149. See, e.g., E. LEv, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 57 (1949) ("It is not
that the silence of Congress implies anything.")
150. This is similar to the "underlying purposes" inquiry of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78 (1975).
151. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969).
152. It seems safe to assume that Title IX, like Title VI, is intended as an effort to
secure equality and is not merely intended to keep federal funds from becoming tainted
with discriminatory usage. See note 123 supra (making argument for Title VI); 118
CONG. REc. 5808 (1972) (Sen. Bayh) (Title IX intended to give women "an equal chance"
in educational programs); Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics Are Outside HEWs
Jurisdiction, 65 GEo. L.J. 49, 50-54, 56-62 (1976) (legislative history of Title IX makes
clear that language was intended to have same meaning as parallel language of Title VI).
153. See pp. 1405-06 infra.
154. As Judge Bazelon has written of Title VI: "In the absence of strong legislative
history to the contrary, the plain purpose of the statute is controlling. Here that purpose
is clearly to eliminate discrimination in programs or activities benefitting from federal
financial assistance." McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 461 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-
judge court). McGlotten held that contributions to a private organization that discrimi-
nated on the basis of race could not, consistent with Title VI, be made tax deductible.
It may well be that under current law, the action would have been dismissed for lack
of standing. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 63-64
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ply such a remedy for the plaintiff."' 55 Justice Brennan disposed of
this criterion in a single paragraph, concluding that Congress's "un-
derlying purpose" in enacting the statute in question was to deter
corporations from spending money to influence the outcome of elec-
tions and that an implied private remedy "would not aid the primary
congressional goal."' 5 In a similarly conclusory manner, Cannon made
hardly any attempt to defend Title IX's enforcement scheme as ade-
quate, 157 even though the agency charged with enforcing it challenged
the scheme's sufficiency. 55 Rather than focus on the relationship
between an implied right of action and the substantive social policies
embodied in the statute,159 the Cannon panel examined the relation-
ship between the private right and the statutory enforcement scheme.130
Properly applied, the question of consistency under civil rights
statutes would be treated much the same way as the question of legis-
lative intent. A court should recognize the breadth of purpose of
civil rights statutes and the likelihood that Congress did not intend
the enforcement mechanism as a limitation on that purpose.' 0 ' In
many cases involving civil rights, the court has expressly criticized
the administrative enforcement mechanism as insufficient to carry
out the congressional purpose.10 2 In Allen, for example, the inade-
quacy was apparent: there were too many jurisdictions for the At-
155. Cart v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
156. Id. at 84.
157. The panel did suggest that before private suits were permitted, the administrative
scheme ought to be given "an opportunity to work." Cannon v. University of Chicago,
559 F.2d 1077, 1082 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Dec.
28, 1977) (No. 77-926).
158. On rehearing, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare argued for
the existence of a private right of action. 559 F.2d at 1080-82. The government also
currently takes the position that a private right of action exists under Title VI. Supple-
mental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23-24, Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, No. 76-811 (U.S. 1977); see note 123 supra. But at least as respects Title IX,
the government's position has not been consistent. See, e.g., UNITED STATES COalMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAWS PROHIBITING SEX DISCRIMINATION 49 (1974) (advis-
ing those who feel they may have been discriminated against on basis of sex in program
covered by Title IX to file complaint with HEW; no mention of possible private suits).
159. Justice Harlan suggested this test in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[In suits
for damages based on violations of federal statutes lacking any express authorization
of a damage remedy, this Court has authorized such relief where, in its view, damages
are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy underpinning the substantive provi-
sions of the statute.")
160. 559 F.2d at 1073-74.
161. More likely, here, as in Allen and other civil rights cases, the two remedies,
administrative review and private litigation, are meant to complement, not to compete
with, one another. See pp. 1389-91 & note 136 supra.
162. E.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 205-06 (1944).
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torney General's staff to keep track of them all.16'0 The Attorney Gen-
eral, who argued in favor of a private right, readily conceded his
office's inability to enforce the statute alone.1 64
Similarly, there would appear to be too many educational programs
receiving federal funds for the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare singlehandedly to enforce Title IX,1a and in Cannon
the Department argued in favor of a private right of action. 66 The
ultimate sanction the Department has against an offender under Title
IX is to cut off federal funds,1 T but the federal government has his-
torically been reluctant to take such measures.' 6s Processing complaints
163. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969).
164. Id. at 557 n.23. The Court called the Attorney General's support of the propo-
sition that a private right should be implied "significant."
165. There were 20,318 school districts and colleges told by the Department to file
acceptable compliance statements by September 30, 1976. By March 15, 1977, only 6,742
had done so. School Law News, at 3 (March 18, 1977). See Shelton & Berndt, supra note
3, at 1138-49, 1158 (extensive interviews and correspondence with HEW staff indicate
difficulties of enforcement); Commentary, supra note 11, at 418 (due to large number
of complaints, enforcement "may be impossible" without private remedy).
166. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1077, 1080-82 (7th Cir. 1977), petition
for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1977) (No. 77-926).
167. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. V 1975). Although 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.9-81.131 (1976) set
regulations for hearings prior to a cutoff of funds, it is clear that the provision is directed
toward permitting a recipient of funds to raise an objection. It says nothing about the
right of a victim of discrimination, except by the filing of an initial complaint and some-
times as an amicus, to participate in the hearing process. See id. § 81.23. It was a similar
deficiency in the welfare review procedures that led the Supreme Court to permit welfare
recipients to bypass the administrative process and bring private suits. Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397, 406, 420 (1970). See also 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972) (Sen. Bayh) (purpose of
administrative review procedures under Title IX to protect recipients from unfair cutoff
of funds).
168. The federal government's reluctance to cut off federal funds may be traced
to political pressures that mounted on the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
when it first received the authority under Title VI to cut off federal funding. See A.
WOLK, THE PRESIDENCY AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 140-42, 147-53 (1971). Even when non-
compliance shows up on a Title VI review, the Department has been hesitant to take the
drastic action of terminating a program's funding. See 3 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT-1974, at 244-64 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS 1974]. In fact, the Department has sometimes had to
be ordered by federal courts to require compliance with civil rights statutes. See School
Law News, at 1-2 (Jan. 6, 1978) (settlement of major cases); Karst, supra note 89, at
1061-62 (citing cases). The experience under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975), which forbids discrimination on the basis of handicap in
federally funded programs, has been equally disappointing to civil rights advocates. The
Department did not issue final compliance regulations until ordered to do so by a
federal court, more than three years after the Act's enactment. Cherry v. Mathews, 419
F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976). Title IX complainants may face the additional obstacle that
many regional offices are not really very interested in its enforcement. Shelton & Berndt,
supra note 3, at 1139 n.lll (quoting high-ranking Department officials).
Implying a private right of action does not require that the administrative agency
be unwilling or hesitant to carry out its statutory enforcement duties. But the difficulties
already posed by the sheer number of programs to be monitored may be exacerbated
in the face of possible administrative intransigence.
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through the Office of Civil Rights is an arduous and time-consuming
procedure.16 9 Moreover, merely ceasing to fund a discriminatory pro-
gram will do nothing to remedy the damage existing violations have
already done to prospective plaintiffs.17 0 These difficulties alone should
make clear that implication of a private right is certainly consistent
with Congress's broad purpose in enacting Title IX.'7' Thus a federal
court seeking to determine whether to permit a private right of ac-
tion under a civil rights statute should focus on whether, given its
broad purpose, the statutory remedy alone is clearly adequate.
The final question posed in Cort was whether the plaintiff's cause
of action is "one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basi-
cally the concern of the States.' '1 72 In Cort Justice Brennan empha-
sized that "[c]orporations are creatures of state law" and that as a
general rule "state law will govern the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion."17 3 Thus the Court held that it was reasonable to expect the
plaintiff to pursue his remedy under state law.174 The Cannon court
assumed arguendo that the cause of action asserted did not displace
any traditional state law remedies.' 75 Causes of action to protect civil
rights are historically not the province of state governments. 76 Civil
rights laws developed initially as a response to discriminatory state
action, 77 and a number of federal causes of action to protect civil
169. Note, supra note 136, at 212-21. In its first few years of enforcing Title IX, the
Department has been particularly slow to resolve complaints. CIVIL RIGHTS 1974, supra
note 168, at 124-27, 306-08; School Law News, at 1, 5 (June 10, 1977); id. at 7-8 (July
22, 1977); id. at 6-7 (Nov. 11, 1977). For example, of 127 Title IX complaints received
in 1974, only 27 were resolved. 40 Fed. Reg. 24149 (1975). Department officials admitted
in 1974 that it could take up to 18 months to resolve a complaint. Shelton & Berndt,
supra note 3, at 1142. Although the Department has recently promised a crackdown
on Title IX offenders, see, e.g., School Law News, at 3 (March 18, 1977); id. at 1 (April
1, 1977), it agreed in December 1977 only to "try" to eliminate its backlog of 3,000 com-
plaints under Title IX and other statutes by September 30, 1979. Id. at 1 (Jan. 6, 1978).
170. "Without the recognition of a private cause of action under [Title IX], indi-
vidual litigants who suffered from non-employment related sex discrimination . . .
would be left with no remedy for the personal injury which they suffered to their
education." Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 780 n.1 (N.D. Ohio
1976).
171. Id.
172. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
173. Id. at 84.
174. Id. at 85.
175. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir. 1977), petition
for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1977) (No. 77-926).
176. In the early post-Civil War period, there was apparently a general expectation
that state courts would enforce the civil rights of the freedmen against discriminatory
state action. Much early civil rights legislation was a response to the courts' unwillingness
-to say nothing of their inability-to do so. See C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
738 (2d ed. 1968).
177. W. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 163-79, 628-30 (1935); C. PRITCnIIer,
supra note 176, at 739-42; see C. WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTIERN HISTORY 69-87
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rights against encroachment by private parties exist as well. 7 8 Thus
even if state law afforded a remedy, it would not be one "traditionally"
in the province of the states. Given this history, a court deciding wheth-
er to imply a private right under a civil rights statute should not pause
long over this criterion.
The proper application of Cort to civil rights statutes can be sum-
marized briefly. First, in determining whether the plaintiff's class is
intended to receive "especial benefit" from the legislation, the court
should determine what group Congress sought to protect from what
sort of discrimination, whether the plaintiff is a member of that group,
and whether the plaintiff alleges the right sort of discrimination. Sec-
ond, the court should take Congress's "broad purpose" in enacting
the statute as guiding its interpretation of whether private actions
should be precluded in the face of legislative silence. Third, the court
should also focus on the broad purpose of civil rights legislation and
consider the extent to which implication of a private right would
aid in accomplishing that purpose before deciding whether a private
right is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme." The court should further seek to determine whether the ex-
isting enforcement scheme appears adequate to protect the plaintiff's
rights, bearing in mind that the scope of the rights was not intended
to be dependent on administrative discretion. Finally, the court should
assume that the cause of action will not displace a traditional state
law remedy, because remedies for violation of civil rights are tradi-
tionally at federal law.
Conclusion
The restrictive manner in which the Supreme Court tested for a
private right of action in Cort v. Ash is not appropriate in the field
of civil rights law. The Cort criteria should, in this field, be applied
in the sympathetic fashion characteristic of the search for private rights
of action under civil rights statutes. Properly applied, the Cort criteria
would lead to the conclusion that private rights of action exist under
Title IX and other civil rights statutes.
(1960). An extensive examination of the legislative history of the first federal civil rights
laws may be found in R. BERCER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 22-36 (1977).
178. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), discussed at note 63 supra (providing cause of
action against private party refusing on basis of race to convey real property); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975) (providing private cause of action in some circumstances against private em-
ployer or union discriminating on basis of race).
1407
